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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Context of Existential Psychiatry 
There can be no doubt that today in the field of psychiatry and of 
psychology there is a great deal of unrest, dissatisfaction, and flux of 
opinion. Much of this motion centers around the basic question that 
psychology and psychiatry have often neglected: What is the nature of 
man? E. Mansell Pattison gives us some indication of this unrest and 
its source when he points out that 
During the first fifty years of this century, psychology seemed to be 
moving inexorably toward a materialistic, mechanistic, reductionistic 
view of man. Yet our own decade has challenged this attitude by 
movements that seek to re-evaluate our views of man; there are vigorous 
efforts to restore mind, consciousness, and soul to respectability? 
It would indeed by an exhausting search to try to trace the social and 
historical origins of the various therapeutic disciplines and far beyond 
the scope of this paper. This paper is here concerned only with existen-
tialism and its influence upon the contemporary psychiatric scene in a way 
described by Pattison above. 
If psychiatry and its "reductionistic" tendencies of the past few de-
cades had created a. "gap!' in the thinking and feeling of many therapists 
towards man, presumably the first thing to come along that could fill this 
gap would be sucked into the vacuum that had been created. Many feel that 
existentialism has filled this need. By definition, according to Allers, 
existentialist, philosophers share a common concern for the being of 
the individual as such, in the concrete situation of his life. n2 Rollo 
2 
May, one of the major spoksmen for existential psychology in the United 
States, feels that only the nature of man is an adequate basis for 
understanding the art of psychotherapy. He chose an existential approach 
precisely because 
The existential developments in our culture, whether in litera-
ture, art, philosophy or science, have precisely as their raison 
detetre the seeping of this understanding of the nature and 
destirly of man.)  
Elsewhere May further points out the effectiveness of existentialism 
in broadening the working base of psychotherapy: 
The existentialists are centrally concerned with rediscovering the 
living person amid the compartmentalization and dehumanization of 
modern culture, and in order to do this they engage in depth psycho-
logical analysis. Their concern is not with isolated psychological 
reactions in themselves but rather with the psychological being of 
the living man who is doing the experiencing. That is to say, they 
use psychological terms with an ontological meaning.4  
To show the contrast between "reductionistic" psychiatry and ex-
istential psychiatry in another way, it might be said that the former is 
concerned with the essence of personality, while the latter is concerned 
with the existence of personality. The former focuses upon objective and 
public data, while the latter focuses upon the subjective and personal data.5  
The importance of this shift in psychiatry today can hardly be overempha-
sized. May shows his disdain of "reductionistic" theories of man's behavior 
by describing one of his fantasies of a Ph. D. in psychology on the eve of 
his death standing before St. Peter seeking entrance into heaven. May 
denounces this old school psychologist by putting these words into the 
mouth of St. Peter: 
You have spent your life making molehills out of mountains--that's 
what you're guilty of. When man was tragic, you made him trivial. 
When he was picaresque, you called him picayune. When he suffered 
passively, you described him as simpering; and when he drummed up 
enough courage to act. you called it stimulus and response. Man had 
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passion; and when you were pompous and lecturing to your class you 
called it "the satisfaction of basic needs," and when you were re-
laxed and looking at your secretary you called it "release of ten-
sion." You made man over into the image of your childhood Erector 
Set or Sunday School maxims--both equally horrendous.6  
From the above statements it may be concluded that psychiatry, sensing 
a lack of an adequate view of man to serve as a working base for therapy, 
has settled by and large for the views of man growing out of European ex-
istentialism. 
Existential Psychiatry and Theology 
Whenever a view of man is proposed, theologians stand with rapt attention. 
Existential Psychiatry, according to the Austrian Viktor Frank1,7 "is spe-
cifically designed to handle those suffering over the philosophical problems 
with which life confronts human beings."8 This sounds innocuous enough until 
the theologian realizes that "philosophical problems" most likely includes 
the majority of things which he feels he is qualified, if not called, to 
handle in his own study or office. Listening to Frankl a bit more may make 
the theologian-counselor frightened for his position: 
Existential analysis and logotherapy aim at bringing the patient to 
the point of highest possible concentration and dedication. It is 
our business, then, to show how the life of every man has a unique 
goal to which only one single course leads.9  
And again he says, 
Existential analysis accordingly is designed to help the individual 
comprehend his responsibility to accomplish each of his tasks. The 
more he grasps the task character of life, the more meaningful will 
his life appear to him. While the man who is not conscious of his 
responsibility simply takes life as a given fact, existential an-
alysis teaches people to see life as an assignment.1° 
Edward Farley summs up: 
Philosophies such as existentialism offer a "philosophical faith" 
and a way for human beings to reflect on their deepest problems. 
4. 
Doctors and psychiatrists not only address themselves to the bodyts 
illnesses but also to deeply rooted psychological problems demanding 
a totally new orientation or "new birth."11  
From the above there seems to be no doubt that existential psychiatry has 
not only a well defined problem in its anthropology, but also it has a well 
thought out solution. The theologian will be interested in examining 
both of these carefully. Manis dilemma will be examined in chapter II, 
and existential solutions or therapeutic goals will be reviewed in chapter 
III. In chapter IV both the goals and the problems will be examined from 
a Christian perspective to see if the solutions proposed by existential 
psychiatry are really adequate to meet the problems and accomplish the 
existential goal. 
Science or Philosophy? 
There is one other question that perhaps should be cleared up before 
proceeding any further. Existential psychiatry has been criticized not 
only from a theological point of view, but also from a scientific stance. 
The question is raised: Can anything which has such a non-empirical base 
as a defined "doctrine" of man possibly still be an empirical science? 
To answer this, the existentialists will first point out that 
every method an scienc0 is based on certain presuppositions--assum-
ptions about the nature of man, the nature of his experience, and so 
forth. These presuppositions are partially conditioned by our cul-
ture and by the particular point in history at which we stand.12  
Pattison also points out that the %herapistis behavior and his results 
depend upon his conception of his patient."13 The existentialist says, 
"We are in effect being more scientific by putting our presuppositions on 
the table before the eyes of all, rather than hiding by claiming not to 
have them." Perhaps the most definitive statement in this regard comes 
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again from Rollo May: 
It is well to remember that the existential movement in psychiatry 
and psychology arose precisely out of a passion to be not less but 
more empirical. Binswanger14 and others were convinced that the 
traditional scientific methods not only did not do justice to the 
data but actually tended to hide rather than reveal what was going 
on in the patient. The existential analysis movement is a protest 
against the tendency to see the patient in forms tailored to our 
own preconceptions or to make him over into the image of our own 
predilections. In this respect it stands squarely within the 
scientific tradition in its widest sense.15 
Existential psychiatry, then, is not only not science watered down with 
philosophy, but it is, positively speaking, the only science adequate to 
deal with the problems of man, the whole man. 
It is, of course, not the aim of logotherapy16 to take the place of 
existing psychotherapy, but only to complement it, thus forming a 
picture of man in his wholeness--which includes the spiritual 
dimension.17  
FUrthermore, it does not compete with or replace any previous scientific 
method (as seen above) but complements it. Rollo May notes that "Existential 
psychiatry . . . is an attitude, an approach to human beings, rather than a 
special school or group. n18  He would probably agree that for any science 
to be able to deal adequately with man, the philosophical dimension and 
the spiritual dimension of man must have an integral part. The question 
then is not either science or philosophy, but the relationship between the 
two. 
FOOTNOTES 
1E. M. PatteSon, "Contemporary Views of Man in Psychology," Journal 
of Religion and Health, 4 (July, 1965), 354. 
2Rudolf Allers, Faith, Reason and Modern Psychiatry: Sources for a 
thesis, edited by Francis J. BracelaTITTN4 York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 
1955 p. 45. 
3Rol10 May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma (Princeton, N. J.: D. 
Van Nostrand Company, 1967), p. 87. 
4Rollo May, Existence, A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology  
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 19587W14:15. 
5Patteson, p. 349. 
6May, Psychology, pp. 3-4. 
7Dr. Viktor Frankl is a professor of neurology and psychiatry at the 
University of Vienna, and director of the neurological and psychotherapeutic 
department of the Vienna Polyclinic. His labors have resulted in his being 
known as the founder of the "third Viennese school of psychiatry," Freud 
having founded the first and Adler the second. 
8Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul: An Introduction to Logo-
therapy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19657 p. 33. 
9Ibid., p. 63. 
p. 66. 
llEdward Farley, Requiem for A Lost Piety: The Contemporary Search for 
the Christian Life (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), 17757 
12May, Existence, p. 29. 
13Patteson, p. 361. 
14Ludwig Binswanger (1881 ) was one of the early explorers in the 
field of existential analysis and a close personal friend of Sigmund Freud. 
15May, Existence, p. 8. 
16 FranklIs own name for his particular type of clinical practice in 
existential psychiatry. 
17Frankl, The Doctor, p. xi. 
18A0110 May, "Existential Psychiatry: An Evaluation," Journal of Religion  
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and Health, 1 (October, 1961), 34. This point is further developed- in 
MAY. FsYchologY, pp. 147.4.57. Zen 3iddhism is an example of the psycho-
therapeutic aspects of a philosophical movement. For a thorough study of 
this consult Alan W. Watts, Psychotherapy East and West (New York: New 
American Library, 1963), especially chapter 4. 
CHAPTER II 
MAN AND HIS DILEMMA IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHIATRY 
Viktor Frankl asserts that his system of psychiatry is grounded 
in anthropology. It's view of man attempts to conceptualize human nature 
in such a way that the resulting system satisir both the empirical 
data of psychiatric research, and the theoretical needs of mental health."1  
This chapter, then, will examine man as seen ontologically by existential 
psychiatry, primarily as represented by Frank1.2 Then human pathology will 
be examined in the same way. 
The Ontological Conception of Man 
Frankl firmly believes in a holistic view of man, that man cannot be 
separated into compartments which are isolated from each other. But he 
insists on supplementing this understanding with what he calls "dimensional 
ontology."3 Man can be viewed somewhat as a figure in solid geometry. If 
a person views a drinking glass, for example, he sees a different form 
according to the position from which he views it. It might be a circle, 
a rectangle, or a cylinder. A drinking glass is not known totally by any 
one of these images, but rather is at one and the same time all three of 
them. Frankl's "dimensional ontology" describes man with three such terms: 
He is physical, phychological, and spiritual. 
Frankl's concept of the physical man is not distinct from commonly 
held views of evolutionary biologists and neuro-physicists. Therefore, 
this question need not be discussed here. Likewise with the psytolicilogida 
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dimension:Of man Tweedie suggests that 
Frankl does not develop a theory of this psychic system in detail, 
but rather, presumes that this has been done sufficiently by others, 
and it is, instead, his task to counterbalance the onesidedness 
which has resulted from an overemphasis upon these drives. He be-
lieves that the observations of Freud, Adler, and Jung have thrown 
considerable light upon the psychic process of man, and have provided 
some very useful information.' 
The main concern here is what is emphasized by Frankl, the spiritual di-
mension of man. Frankl sees his emphasis upon spirituality as the thing 
which characterizes his system in distinction to Freud. He states: 
It is true that Freud once declared in conversation: "Humanity has 
always known that it possesses a spirit; it was my task to show that 
it has instincts as well." But I myself feel that humanity has de-
monstrated ad nauseam in recent years that it has instincts, drives. 
Today it appears more important to remind man that he has a spirit, 
that he is a spiritual being. 
Rollo May says nearly the same thing in asserting that the religious nature 
belongs in any psychological discussion of man. 
What we are saying is simply that value (or more accurately, the act 
of valuing) is part of the structure of human experience itself. The 
Problems of religion, thus,%are not a special subject now brought in 
because of cultural whim in the temporary religious revival, but mat 
and parcel of manes experience as man. italics addeillo 
Likewise, in examining mental patients, psychiatrist Edith Weigert finds 
that in the "sensitive, neurotic person there is a longing for the spiri-
tual values . . • that can transcend the conflicts and make life meaningful 
and whole.' 
All men have this spiritual dimension, even those who are not aware 
of it. Frankl calls this the "spiritual unconscious." He does not deny 
the existence or even the importance of the unconscious in the structure 
of manes personality, but he feels that Freud emphasis upon the un-
conscious as being instinctual drives is not adequate. "More important 
that the unconscious psychic drives is the spiritual unconscious in man."8 
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In this sense, Frankl speaks of a "height" psychology to supplement the 
Freudian "depth" psychology.9  
VanderVeldt summarizes the "spiritual unconscious" and further points 
out that it is clinically demonstrable: 
Existential analysis . . . states that God is not a father-image but 
that the father is an image of God, and that the proof of this state-
ment lies in the fact that an unprejudiced analysis of the unconscious 
depth of a man's psyche reveals his relation to God. Even when 
treating persons who profess to be decidedly irreligious, the exis-
tential analysts find what they call unconscious religion . . . an 
unconscious relationship to God.10  
It is this religious or spiritual dimension that unifies the three spheres 
of a man's personality. "Some belief in purpose . . serves in personality 
like a steel core in an electro-magnet--it unifies the lines of force and 
thus enables the magnet to exert effective power."11  
Frankl's holistic view of man (body, psyche, and spirit united on one 
person) leads to certain other characteristics that mark the human person 
and distinguish him from the rest of the animal kingdom. They are all 
carefully interwoven in a dynamic concept of the personality process. But 
they will have to be discussed individually, and hence somewhat artificially. 
The first of these characteristics is the concept of responsibility. Man 
is not autonomous. He stands in a relationship to something outside of 
himself. He is responsible to something or someone. Responsibility cannot 
have meaning if it is derived from man's own ego and super-ego. %%Os free-
dom and man's responsibility exist independently. But, in the last analysis, 
man cannot be responsible to himself alone. Behind his conscience stands 
an extra-human authority.n12  Man has tasks and assignments in his world 
context, and these must be acted upon, not arbitrarily, but with a view of 
transcendence that is revealed to him.13 There is a moral law, then, which 
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is not universal, but individual, coming to light in the specific situation 
of the person. Frankl asserts that 
Human responsibility, which existential analysis strives to make 
men aware of, is a responsibility springing from the singularity 
and uniqueness of each mants existence. Mants existence is a 
responsibility springing from mants finiteness.14  
Responsibility leads to a second characteristic, namely that man 
is not bound to the past, but is future-orientated. Man cannot really 
exist without a fixed point in the fixture. He must see life as heading 
somewhere. 'kinder normal conditions his entire present is shaped around 
that fixture point, directed toward it like iron filings toward the pole 
of a magnet."-5 Douglas Fox contrasts this with "insight" psychology: 
"[in logotherapil a man is understood, not in terms of some infantile trauma 
(or, at least, not in terms of that alone), but rather as a being who is 
going somewhere, aiming at something, intending something. 1,16  This emphasis 
of Franklts is hailed by Gordon Allport as a definite advancement over 
present day American psychology: 
The chief shortcoming of American psychology up to now, I think, is 
its poverty in representing the future. While most people are ab-
sorbed in planning for . . . the future, psychology for the most part 
is busily engaged in tracing their lives backwards.17 
Likewise, another American, Abraham Maslow, reaches a similar conclusion: 
I think it fair to say that no theory of psychology will ever be 
complete that does not centrally incorporate the concept that man 
has his future within him, dynamically active at this present 
moment.18  
It is not difficult to see the influence of European existentialism in 
the above opinions. 
Mants responsibility and his future-directedness are not termini im-
potestatium, for man has the freedom to act in their behalf. The basic 
characteristic of freedom is a key concept in Franklts psychiatric system. 
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Man is free to choose his course and direct his future existence. Frankl 
reacts violently against what he calls "pan-determinism." This is the 
view that holds that man is bound deterministically in his course. Rather, 
says Frankly man is self-determining. 
Man does not simply exist, but always decides what his existence 
will be, what he will become in the next moment. Br the same token 
every human being has the freedom to change at any instant . . . • 
One of the main features of human existence is the capacity to rise 
above such conditions and transcend them.19  
In another place Frankl asserts that 
The freedom of decision, so-called freedom of the will, is for the 
unbiased person a matter of course; he has a direct experience of 
himself as free. The person who seriously doubts freedom of the will 
must either be hopelessly prejudiced by a deterministic philosophy 
or suffering from a paranoid schizophrenia, in which case he ex-
periences his will as having been "made" unfree • 20 
It appears quite obvious that Frankl takes a dim view of all who hold that 
the will is bound and man is determined. One reason for his doing so is 
that this is an escape from reswnsibilitys 
Neurotic fatalists . . . are prone to blame childhood educational and 
environmental influences for "making" them what they are and having 
determined their destinies. These persons are attempting to excuse 
their weaknesses of character. They accept these weaknesses as given 
facts, instead of seeing that having had such unfortunate early in-
fluences only makes it more incumbent upon them to practice self-
restraint and seek to school themselves differently.21  
Another reason why Frankl seems to reject determinism is that it inhibits 
ethical choice. "Fatalistic conclusions . . . are dangerous because they 
paralyze man's will to defy his inner destiny. The man who believes his 
fate is sealed is incapable of repealing it."22 Frankl, then, regards all 
moral despair as an ethical "weltschmerz" that could paralyze one's ethical 
actions. 
It is important to caution here that Frankl is not speaking against 
a biological determinism. He realizes that man lives within his inherited 
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characteristics. But since the psychological and especially the spiritual 
dimensions of man are free, he speaks of man basically as having a freedom 
of the will. Nothing that happens to a man that is beyond his control is 
final; he is still free to accept one or another attitude concerning his 
circumstances. 
Franklts viewpoint here is definitely theological. He means that man 
can choose the moral good. Theologian Paul Johnson summarizes Franklts 
position in this way: 
There is a mood of helplessness and despair in some forms of recent. 
theology which contend that man can do little or nothing for him-
self, that he is so infected by original sin or so feeble in his 
goodness and wisdom that he is virtually a prisoner of his evil im-
pulses, enmities, and fatal estrangement.23  
In this viewpoint, Frankl is not essentially different from the majority 
opinion in American psychology today. There are no real exponents today 
of an evil view of man. Even Karl Menninger, who comes the closest, feels 
that a mants life is lived out in a struggle between the good and evil 
forces present in every person.2k Carl Rogers is one of the strongest 
supporters of the view that man is by nature good.25  
Abraham Maslow does not seem to find such a strong position in the 
existentialists as was defined above. He feels that existentialists are 
trying to integrate the 'higher" and the "lower" natures of man. He points 
out that Eastern and Western religions and philosophies have basically 
claimed that one must reach the "higher" by overcoming the "lower." "The 
existentialists however, teach that both are simultaneously defining character- 
istics of human nature. Neither can be repudiated; they can only be in- 
tegrated."26  
Another characteristic essential to mants nature, according to Frankl, 
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is the "will to meaning," It is because of this concept that Frankl is 
regarded as the founder of the "Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy." 
Frued had spoken of a "will to pleasure" and Adler spoke of a 5w11.1 to 
power." Frankl regards the "will to meaning" as an advancement beyond these 
systems. Man does not want basically pleasure or power, but he wants some-
thing, needs something to keep his life in focus. This must be a purpose 
for which to live. When man has such a purpose, his life has meaning, and 
this meaning "pulls" him into responsible and happy living. Frankl cites 
some opinion sampling in this respect: 
A poll of public opinion was conducted a few years ago in France. 
The results showed that 89% of the people polled admitted that man 
needs "something" for the sake of which to live. Moreover, 61% 
conceded that there was something, or someone, in their own lives 
for whose sake they were even really to die. I repeated this poll 
at my clinic in Vienna among both the patients and the personnel, 
and the outcome was practically the same as among the thousands of 
people screened in France; the difference was only 2%. In other 
words, the will to meaning is in most people fact, not faith.27  
The will to meaning is the true motivational factor in human personality. 28 
This aspect will be discussed more tally in chapter III. 
Franklts writings in a few places seem to reveal an uneasiness in 
viewing man totally in an "individualistic" way. He occasionally hints 
at a social concept of man. Man cannot be fully understood outside of the 
human social context. Here is one such indications 
We have seen how the meaningfulness of human existence is based upon 
the uniqueness and singularity of the human person. We have seen 
further that creative values are actualized in the form of accom-
plishments that bear on community. Community in its turn confers 
existential meaning upon personal uniqueness and singularity.29 
The various spheres of mants personality have been examined, and 
certain basic characteristics or attributes such as responsibility, future-
directedness, freedom, striving-for-meaning, and social orientation have been 
noted. The next question is: What happens when man does not function properly? 
15 
Human Pathology.Mants Existential Dilemma 
Describing accurately human psychopathology is of supreme importance 
in existential psychiatry. Frankl, for example, believes that the most im- 
portant step in successful psychotherapy is a proper diagnosis of the patient's 
trouble. It seems only natural that existential psychiatry would borrow 
heavily from existential philosophy in describing mants troubles. This 
is certainly true. It does not mean, however, that Frankl and others 
would see human psychopathology on in existential terms. Frankl, for 
example, accepts a rather standard definition of "psychosis," at least 
as far as EUropean psychiatry goes, and feels that frequently there can 
be somatic etiology connected with psychic symptomatology." But the 
largest area of disease category for Frankl is that of "neurosis." This 
is a state which arises and likewise expresses its symptomatology in the 
psychic state of the person. If the three basic aspects of mants person- 
ality31 are kept in mind, it is easy to see how various diseases express 
themselves in certain of these aspects. For example, some diseases may 
arise in mants psychological sphere, but express their symptomatology in 
the physical sphere. Since Frankl speaks of a spiritual aspect of man's 
personality, it would seem logical that there would be neuroses which 
would both arise and express themselves in this dimension. Frankl calls 
these the noogenic neuroses. Tweedie summarizes Franklts reasoning: 
In the spiritual dimension of man there often arises the condition 
in which the will to meaning is frustrated. This may be due to a 
moral conflict, to a specific spiritual problem, or to an existential 
crisis in development, such as may be observed in adolescence and 
the climacteric experience. Inasmuch as persons who are suffering 
under circumstances often refer to the emptiness and pointlessness of 
such in life, this is referred to . . . as existential vacuum.31 
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This describes the noogenic neuroses, and the remainder of this chapter 
will, as hinted by the above quotation, look at the symptomatology and 
the etiology, or causative factors, of these neuroses. 
Frankl speaks of the "existential vacuum" as being one of the chief 
marks of human mental suffering today. It is a widespread phenomenon which 
is seen especially in boredom. 
Let us think, for instance, of "Sunday neurosis," that kind of de-
pression which afflicts people who become aware of the lack of con. 
tent in their lives when the rush of the busy week is over and the 
void within themselves becomes manifest. Not a few cases of suicide 
can be traced back to this existential vacuum. Such widespread 
phenomena as alcoholism and juvenile delinquency are not understand-
able unless we recognize the existential vacuum underlying them. This 
is also true of the crises of pensioners and aging people.33 
Frequently the person who is bored asks the question: "What is the meaning 
of life?" To him, life seems meaningless. Frankl says that "among perms 
sons of this sort we would class, say someone who had lost a loved one 
around whom his life revolved, and who then despairingly raises the question 
of whether his own life any longer has meaning."34 This kind of meaning-
lessness, however, is not always connected with a sudden crisis situation. 
It can grow slowly at certain times of life. An illustration can make 
that clear: 
The problem of meaning . . . takes on this overwhelming urgency par-
ticularly at puberty, when the essential uncertainty of human life 
is suddenly revealed to young people maturing and struggling in-
tellectually. A science teacher in a junior high school was once 
explaining that the life of organisms, and so of man also, was "in 
the final analysis nothing but" a process of oxidation, of com-
bustion. One of his students suddenly sprang to his feet and 
passionately threw at him the question: If that% so, then what 
kind of meaning does life have? '3) 
Closely related to meaninglessness is loneliness. Freud, Rank, 
and many classical psychotherapists have suggested that all loneliness 
may really be separation anxiety.36 This is the kind of anxiety a person 
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feels when he is about to leave familiar and secure surroundings for a 
new and adventurous existence where he is unknown and hence unloved. 
Sullivan and Fromm..Reichmann have suggested that this is related to con-
formity. May develops this point: 
Loneliness is a common experience of those who conform, for while 
on one hand they are driven to conform because of loneliness, on 
the other, the validating of the self by means of becoming like 
everyone else reduces their sense of self and their experience of 
personal identity. The process makes for inner emptiness, thus 
causing greater loneliness.37  
Existential psychiatry uses no other term more frequently than the 
term "anxiety.108 Anxiety is described by poets, philosophers, thee. 
logians, and psychiatrists, but it still remains somewhat of an enigma.39 
Rollo May describes anxiety as the "experience of the threat of imminent 
non-being."4° It is to be sharply distinguished from fear. Fear is 
that experience which is directly tied to a feared object. A patient 
sitting in a dentist chair fears the dentist=s drill. Anxiety, on the 
other hand, is not so connected. A person can go through life not 
knowing what he is afraid of, not perceiving anything as being dangerous 
to him. He simply has an inner anxiousness resulting from ,  an inner con-
flict. He perceives a lack of well-being and wholesome relationship to 
life, but is unable to identify it. May elsewhere puts it somewhat dif-
ferently: 
We must now differentiate neurotic from normal anxiety . . . . Normal 
anxiety is anxiety which is proportionate to the threat, does not 
involve repression, and can be confronted constructively on the con-
scious level . . . . Neurotic anxiety, on the other hand, is a re-
action which is disproportionate to the threat, involves repression 
and other forms of intrapsychic conflict, and is managed by various 
kinds of blocking-off activity and awareness.41  
Psychiatrist Juan J. Lopez Ibor likewise sees anxiety as a threat of 
nothingness. This fear is seen in two basic forms: fear of madness and 
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fear of death. Both of them are essentially a fear of the °dissolution 
of the personality," or non-being.42 
Along with anxiety there is a second ontological dilemma which man 
faces. That is guilt. This is the condition of man when he fails to 
fulfill his life responsibilities. It is important to note that most 
existentialists do not say that a man simply "has guilt feelings," in the 
sense that it is his attitude that is most significant; existentialists 
say that a person is guilty. Rollo May describes four main characteristics 
of ontological guilt. The first is that everyone participates in it. No 
human being fully fUlfills his own personality or life goals. The second 
is that such guilt does not come from cultural prohibitions. Man is not 
guilty because he disobeys mores; rather, he is guilty because he can see 
himself as a person who can choose or fail to choose. Thirdly, ontological 
guilt is not neurotic; that is, it is not repressed, but accepted and con-
fessed. Finally, ontological guilt does not lead to symptoms, but can 
have a constructive effect upon the personality.43 Mayts first characteristic 
is similar to the "existential frustration" of Frankl and to the "existential 
gap" of Maslow: 
Existentialism . . . deals radically with the human predicament pre-
sented by the gap between human aspirations and human limitations 
(between what the human being is, what he would like to be, and what 
he could be). This is not far from the identity problem. A person 
is both actually and potentially. 
Psychiatrist Edith Weigert perhaps gives the best overall description 
of mants existential dilemma. This may serve as a good summary of this 
section: 
A person who grows up in such basic loneliness learns to repress the 
images of hope and trust in himself as well as in his world. He does 
not dare to dive into an unknown future, to grow, to experiment, 
testing the free play of his impulses in an expanding world. He cannot 
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learn from failures and transcends frustrations in the ever renewed 
hope and trust in a brighter future. When the lonely, distrustful 
child grows into adolescence, he misses the regenerative power of 
erotic experience. His anxieties and defensive cautions keep him in 
prolonged incestuous bondage. Sexual experience mains meaningless 
if it is not inspired by trusting love. The anxieties of basic lone.. 
liness flood the erotic fantasy life with sadistic and masochistic 
images and, threatened in his integrity, the discouraged person recoils 
deeper into this loneliness and does not reach the fall life of mature 
manhood or womanhood.45 
Having looked at the symptomatology, this paper will now turn to the 
etiology, or causative factors, of man's frustration, loneliness, anxiety, 
guilt, and boredom, according to existential psychiatry. 
At this point there is not unanimous agreement among specialists. Many 
reasons are cited for manta existential frustration. Franks speaks of 
irresponsible living. A person, makes the wrong choices in life, frequently 
because he does not see how his wrong choices lead him into further misery. 
For example, a person who is lonely frequently seeks what he considers to 
be love by visiting prostitutes, When such behavior develops as a pattern, 
his ability to really love and accept love is impaired by the very activity 
which he feels can meet his needs. Frankl believes that the most important 
thing for happy living is the ability to make the proper choice for the 
most fulfilling and authentic behavior. He theorizes that "Alen we set up 
pleasure as the whole meaning of life, we insure that in the final analysis 
life shall inevitably seem meaningless.'" Meaninglessness comes about 
when the individual attempts to satisfy noetic needs by purely physical 
means. "Gratification of the sexual instincts affords pleasure, the er•• 
oticism of infatuation gives joy, but love brings happiness. Love is 
on the spiritual level, eroticism on the psychological, and sexual grati-
fication is purely physical. Man is not able to satisfy basic existential 
(noetic, or spiritual). needs without genuine love. Responsible living im- 
plies that an individual 
This concept of Frankl's 
the American scene until 
as "Reality Therapy" was 
maintains that people do 
are ill because they act 
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chooses to meet needs with proper activities. 
is rather revolutionary. It was seldom heard on 
just recently when a new school of psychiatry known 
developed by William Glasser. Glasser, like Frankl, 
not act irresponsibly because they are ill, jimt 
irresponsiblY.48  
Another cause of man's existential dilemma is the repression of normal 
guilt. Man refuses to admit his humanity and face up to his failures 
to live the responsible life. Such repression of guilt causes a general 
anxiety. May believes "that much of modern man's experience of emptiness, 
his ennui and feeling of lack of zest and his experience that life is not 
worth living, are related to the repression ofnnormal guilt." 49 One of 
the major promulgators of this view is O. Hobart Mowrer. 
Mowrer is closely linked to the existential schools in correctly 
identifying the source of neurotic and psychotic illness as essen-
tially a moral conflict. At some level of personality, guilt 
feelings are related to genuine guilt or wrong moral choice" 
Mower believes that neuroses and psychoses result from behavior that 
violates a person's conscience. Guilt feelings in the emotionally disturbed 
person are normal and not to be lightly dismissed. Emotional problems re. 
suit from misdeeds, rather than being the cause of them. "Sin, the basic 
problem, stems from repression of the conscience rather than from repression 
of instinctual drives."51 Frankl would extend Mower's concern and aptAk 
instead of a repressed spirituality or an unconscious tod who is not allowed 
to be expressed in the person's personality.52  
Erich Fromm identifies the source of man's dilemma in his inability 
to love others as himself. Often this comes as a result of developed 
and nurtured ego-centricism. 
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There is no more convincing proof that the injunction *Love thy 
neighbor as thyself" is the most important norm for living, and that 
its violation is the basic cause of unhappiness and mental illness, 
than the evidence gathered by the psychoanalyst. Whatever complaints 
the neurotic patient may have, whatever symptoms he may present, are 
rooted in his inability to love . . . .53  
Rollo May identifies the basic cause of anxiety in this twentieth 
century as a loss of significance and of personal identity in the modern 
world. When Willie Loman in The Death of a Salesman is characterized as 
one who "never knew who he was," millions feel an identification with him. 
May cites a recent examplecof man's frustrated reaction to such loss of 
identity by quoting Mario Savio, the senior in philosophy who led the huge 
revolts and massive sit-ins at Berkeley: 
There is a time when the operation of the machine (f collectivized 
educatiql becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart that you 
can't take part . . you've got to put your bodies upon the gears 
and upon the wheels, upon the leven, upon all the apparatus and 
you've got to make it stop . . . 
Students were reacting against their inner feelings of lack of significance 
and their feelings of worthlessness. 
°The most striking symbol for the individual's sense of insignificance 
is, of course, the ever-present specter of thermonuclear war."55 Such an 
imminent possibility reduces the person's feeling of self...worth and self-
fulfillment to nil. He can often lose interest in life, in responsibility, 
in vocation, family, and fature. Man's impotence in the face of such a 
threat "moved into anxiety, the anxiety into regression and apathy, these 
in turn into hostility, and the hostility into an alienation of man from 
Mari • 66  One might also consider modern "cybernation" as a force that causes 
people to doubt their worth and significance in life. 
May also points out that anxiety can be caused by a discrepancy in 
a person's perception. He tries to evaluate himself by some constant 
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standard, but the standard starts to shift, and the person's sourceoof 
orientation is of no value. Society is in such a flux today. 
When the presuppositions in a society are themselves threatened, the 
individual has-no basis on which to orient himself when he is con-
fronted with a specific threat. Since the inner citadel of society 
itself is in a state of confusion and traumatic change during such 
specific threats which confront him. The result for the individual 
is profound disorientation,,Rsychological confusion, and hence chronic 
or acute panic and anxiety.X 
This chapter has tried to show how man looks in the view of an ex-
istential psychiatrist.58 Mention has been made of man's basic tri-phasic 
nature, his attributes, such as freedom and responsibility, and-Abe basic 
"diseases" or symptoms of the many frustration-producing elements in man's 
modern world. The next step is to turn to an examination of the therapeutic 
goals and methods of existential analysis. 
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CHAPTER III 
THERAPEUTIC GOALS AND RESOURCES IN EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS 
The Goals of Existential Psychiatry 
In seeking to evaluate any psychotherapeutic system, it is important 
to know what specific goals have been set forth by their respective therapists. 
This is not an easy task, for frequently the therapists themselves have not 
clearly defined their goals, and often may be unaware of exactly what goals 
they are trying to accomplish. In a number of places Frankl alludes to 
the ultimate purpose that he has in mind for his clients. First, "existential 
analysis . . . aims at bringing the patient to the point of highest pos-
sible concentration and dedication. It is our business . . . to show how 
the life of every man has a unique goal to which only one single course 
leads."- This is the goal of responsible living: 
Existential analysis accordingly is designed to help the individual 
comprehend his responsibility to accomplish each of his tasks. The 
more he grasps the task character of life, the more meaningful will 
his life appear to him. While the man who is not conscious of his 
responsibility simply takes life as a given 
f
act, existential analysis 
teaches; people to see life as an assignment. 
The goal of responsible living, then, leads to the more ultimate goal of 
a meaningful life. The goals of logotherapy might be described frequently 
as'the opposites of the existential dilemmas described above.3 The logo-
therapist recognizes these goals as spiritual: 
- - - 
It is, of course, not the aim of logotherapy to take the place of ex-
isting psychotherapy, but only to complement it, thus forming a  
picture of man in his wholeness—which includes thespiritual dimen7 
-SuCh-i-theiipy direitea toward the human spirit will be indi- 
__ 
cated in cases where the patient turns to a doctor for help in his 
spiritual distress, not because of actual disease.' 
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As a matter of fact, Frankl refers to his work as a "medical ministry."5 
He believes that it is high time "that the medical profession forsook 
the tendency to become a group of technicians (i.e., 'mechanics') who deal 
with patients as if they were machines or psychic apparatuses instead of 
spiritual beings."6 He refers, of course, not just to psychiatrists, 
but to medical men in general. 
Frankl claims that his objective is not to force his life goals or 
values upon the client, although this is a danger. Fox comments to this 
effect: 
It is true, unfortunately, that Frankl's approach could . . . lead to 
a mere manipulation of the counselee, the imposing on the latter of 
a stronger man's sense of value. But Frank? explicitly disavows such 
a procedure.? 
In Franklts own words 
Medical ministry is not intended to be a substitute for religion, nor 
even for psychotherapy as it has hitherto been known. Rather, as we 
have already said, it is to be a supplement. We have nothing to say, 
would have nothing to offer, to the relig
i
ous person who finds se-
curity in the mysteryoof his metaphysics. 
However, Dr. Weisskopf-Joelson, who considers herself to be in the logo-
therapeutic tradition, seems to go beyond that view. Her goal-is to pro-
vide a philosophy for life: 
Psychoanalytic thinking is based upon the assumption that the suc-
cessfully analyzed patient will automatically develop his own phil-
osophy of life, or he will avail himself of a ready-made philosophy 
which is available in his culture. This assumption becomes more tenuous 
if the culture offers little by way of such philosophies . . . . Lack 
of strong comprehensive and consistent faith characterizes the entire 
world at the present time. Thus s thesis, following psychological 
analysis, cannot be left to chance. talics mini79  
Franklts goals lead ultimately also to self-actualization. One of 
his favorite quotations, appeai-ing in almost every one of his discussions 
on psychotherapy, is Goethe's comment, "If we take people as they are, we 
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make them worse. If we treat them as if they were what they ought to 
be, we help them to become what they are capable of becoming. 1110 
Rollo May describes his goals for therapy with somewhat similar 
terminology: 
Our chief concern in therapy is with the potentiality of the human 
being. The goal of therapy is to help the patient actualize his poten-
tialities. . . The goal of therapy is not the absence of anxiety, 
but rather'- the changing of neurotic anxiety into normal anxiety, and 
the development of the capacity to live with and use normal anxiety. 
The patient after therapy may well bear more anxiety than he had before, 
but it will be conscious anxiety and he will be able to use it con-
structively. Nor is the goal the absence of guilt feeling, but rather 
the transformation of neurotic guilt into normal guilt, together with 
the development of the capacity to use this normal guilt creatively.11  
May hopes to give the patient a belief in "purpose" to make life meaningful. 
Only such a purpose, even if fragmentary, is able to achieve personality 
health. Purpose is the unifying force in a personts life.12  
Carl Rogers stands in this same tradition. The result of such therapy 
(existential) is that a person "becomes an autonomous human person, able to 
be what he is and to choose his course."13 He can confirm himself as a 
unique individual who is architect of his own future. He is free to face 
his own impulses and possibilities, even death, molding his own attitudes 
and eliminating his fears and frustrations.14  
The Resources and Methods of Existential Psychiatry 
The question logically arises: How does the existentialist move his 
client from the existential dilemma to the goals which have been set for 
him? For Frankl, man has an inner striving for meaning. The "will to 
meaning" is like an inner force that pulls the person in the direction of 
the goal. If one were to find an apt illustration of the nature of this 
force, it might be compared to a horse trying to pull a wagon with its breaks 
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locked. The work of the therapist is to release the breaks to free the "will 
to meaning" to carry the person toward wholeness. Frankl explains the origin 
of the term "logotherapy by pointing to logos, the Greek word for "meaning." 
"According to logotherapy, the striving to find a meaning in one's life is 
the primary motivational force in man."15 This force is one of the essences 
of a man's personality, and will be effective, in his life unless some other 
• 
force is present to hinder its operation. 
The method of freeing a person's "will to meaning" is a logical one. 
Note Frankl's argumentation, for example, when dealing with a prospective 
suicide: 
We are concerned here with demonstrating that it is our duty to con-
vince the would-be suicide that taking one's own life is categori-
cally contrary to reason, that life is meaningful to every human 
being under any circumstances. We believe that this can be done by 
objective argument and analysis of the problem on its own terms- 
by the methods of logotherapy .16
- 
This is an educative process. Frankl maintains that "logotherapy is 
ultimately education to responsibility; and with this responsibility the 
patient must push forward independently towirds the concrete meaning of 
his personal existence."17 
A logotherapist teaches the acceptance of meaningful values. This 
can enable the person to find meaningful life experiences. Ungersma 
describes three types of values found in logotherapy: creative, experiential, 
and attitudinal.18 Each patient is shown how each of these value types can 
apply to his particular life situation. Creative values are those which 
contribute something of quality to the world's knowledge, to beauty, or 
to the welfare of mankind in general. Most people do not realize that 
they have potential to make such contributions. These values are not re-
served only for the specially endowed. In the light of the vocational 
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unhappiness of many people, the logotherapist must show such people how they 
can creatively contribute to the welfare of others. Experiential values are 
those that a person can cultivate as he develops a sense of appreciation for 
the natural beauty of life: music, stimulating truth, nature, children, etc. 
Attitudinal values are perhaps the most significant for the logotherapist. 
Ungersma notes that here 
the philosophical insight can become a precision tool of great 
therapeutic power in the hands of the skilled analyst, psychiatrist, 
or counselor. Where a life has been strictly limited as to creative 
and experiential values, it still can be led in therapy to achieve 
greatness in its attitudes . . . . Here it is the Wrzliche Seelsorger, 
"the medical minister," in Frankl that leads him to put his main 
emphasis on the problem of human suffering . . . Existential logo-
therapy is ready to meet man, however, when his creativity fails to 
give values to life and experience no longer gives meaning to it. 
A man can still find life purposive, and can demonstrate this by 
the way or manner in which he faces the inevitable or the way in 
which he handles suffering.19 
In this regard, Frankl spends considerable time discussing the meaning 
of life, death and suffering. The meaning of life can never be discussed 
in the abstract. There is meaning of life for a given person in a given 
circumstance, and what is essential is that that person learn to recognize 
that he is the one who is being asked the question of meaning in that 
circumstance. "Each man is questioned by life; and he can only answer to 
life by answering for hisrown life. "2° But true psychotherapy can never 
rest after it has enabled a person to see meaning in life. It must also 
prepare a man for suffering, give him meaning in his suffering. Logo-
therapy avoids the "escapism" of some forms of therapy. "Escapism means 
evading reality, and it consists precisely in fleeing from the reality and 
from the predestined necessity of suffering, and from the possibility of 
filling that suffering with meaning. 1121  Frankl, of course, is speaking 
only of suffering which is unavoidable. Here the logotherapist is to 
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enable the sufferer to accept his fate and to realize positive attitudinal 
values. The chief requirement is a faith that "lifels meaning is deeper 
than any circumstance."22 A frequently cited case of Franklts well il-
lustrates the thinking of the logotherapist: 
A nurse in my clinic underwent a laparotomy which revealed an in-
operable malignant tumor. In her despair, she called for me. In 
our discussion, it turned out that she was not so much in despair 
with respect to her illness, as in regard to her inability to go 
back to work. She loved her vocation above everything, and now was 
unable to perform itt What could I say to her in this situation? 
The situation of this nurse was really hopeless (she died one week 
later). However, I attempted to make it clear to her that to work 
eight or more hours in a day is no accomplishment, anyone can do 
that; but to be so willing to work as she_was, and yet to be un-
able to do sc), ifia, nevertheless, no_tto despair, that is A Teal 
achievement which few are able to carry out. So I asked her whether 
she would not be invalidating the service of thousands of patients, 
which she, as a nurse, had given, if she acted as if being ill had 
no meaning. As soon as she despaired in her situation, I told her, 
she made the meaning of a human life stand and fall upon how many 
hours a person works; and thus denied the ill and diseased every 
right to live, and every qualification for existence. In reality, 
she had been given a unique opportunity . . . to be an example of 
a true human being.23  
Suffering, and likewise death, cannot negate a man's possibility of finding 
meaning in life. "Finality, temporality, is therefore not only an essential 
characteristic of human life, but also a real factor in its meaningfulness.u24  
One must never fail to see the historical character of life. Only facing 
the possible end of life can make the present life fully meaningful and 
fully human.25  
Viktor Frankl arrived at his meaning-philosophy completely through 
personal experience. During World War II, as a young Jewish psychiatrist, 
he was confined by the Nazis in a series of concentration camps, including 
Auschwitz and Dachau. His autobiography26 tells of the development of his 
attitudes toward life's meaning while at these concentration camps. When 
first imprisoned, he attempted to take with him a manuscript that he had 
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been working on. But this was confiscated and destroyed. He then attempted 
to reconstruct the entire work on scraps of paper. This goal, no doubt, 
added to his meaning of life and enabled him to persevere many of the hard-
ships. 
To teach meaningful living to a client, a proper relationship must 
exist between the person and his doctor. The counselor-counselee relation-
ship is very significant. Hora notes that 
the existential psychotherapist does not "do" psychotherapy, he 
lives it. He meets his patient in the openness of an interhuman 
existential encounter. He does not seek to make interpretations, 
he does not evaluate and judge; he allows what is to be, so that 
it can reveal itself- in the essence of its being, and then preceeds 
to elucidate what he understands.27  
Fox, likewise, sees the relationship as important and compares Frankl to 
Huber. 
There is in Frankl a very Buberian involvement of the counselor in 
the meeting with the counselee; there is the approach of an authentic 
"Thou," willing to become a "presence" to the other, daring to open 
himself, t reveal that structure of thought and feeling by which 
he lives.2° 
Rogers sees somewhat the same emphasis: 
The essence of therapy, as I see it carried on by myself and by 
others, is a meeting of two persons.  in which the therapist is 
openly and freely himself and evidences this perhaps most fully 
when he can freely and acceptantly enter into the world of the 
other.29  
Rogers concludes that in the more successful therapies the counselor is 
reacting as his real self with real feelings, rather than as a manipulator 
of people and ideas" 
Rollo May is similar to Frankl in his views of how to get a patient 
from the existential dilemma to meaningful existence. May, however, does 
not talk of a "will to meaning," but of an inner need to preserve centeredness 
of personality. Every individual has the need and the ability to establish 
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centeredness and from there to go out to establish meaningful relationships 
with other people.31 Like Frankl and Rogers, May also emphasizes the coun-
selor-counselee relationship. He speaks of presence: 
By this we mean that the relationship of the therapist and patient 
is taken as a real one, the therapist being not merely a shadowy 
reflector but an alive human being who happens, at that hour, to be 
concerned not with his own problems but with understanding and ex-
periencing so far as possible the being of the patient.32  
Other therapists have different means for bringing about the thera- 
peutic goals. Mowrer believes that "confession" and changed behavior 
which leads to a reconciliation with one's "significant others" will lead 
to increasing openness and authenticity of the self in relationships.33  
By the act of confessing one is healed. Today "it is possible to see a 
man's personality not simply as the product of innate disposition fashioned 
by environmental forces, but as something which he himself has achieved 
and which, therefore, he may also transform. "31  All of the existentialists 
have seen man as the source of his own strength and power for the healing 
of his being. Meaning, wholeness, authenticity--all these came out of a 
person's inner natural endowements. Likewise, Glasser's therapeutic tech-
nique assumes the same thing. He cures irresponsibility by telling, de-
manding that the patient be responsible. Then, as a therapist, he,demon-
strates faith in the person that he can "become what he really is--re-
sponsible."35  
Pattison points out the basic difference between the existentialists 
and the directive or behavioral therapies of Skinner and Eysenck. The 
latter hold that "human personality is a neurophysiological mechanism that 
can be modified by appropriate neurophysiological treatments."36 There- 
fore, they apply physical treatments and conditioning to modify behavior. 
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"The whole axis of the treatment relationship is shifted from freedom, 
responsibility, and choice to one of mechanistic alteration of a na-
turalistic organism."37  
This chapter has examined the means by which the existential psycho-
therapists hope to achieve the goals they have established for thOir 
clients. It is now time to turn in the final chapter to a theological 
evaluation of existential psychiatry with an attempt to determine the kind 
of help such a system might provide the Christian pastoral counselor. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS AND CHRISTIAN PASTORAL COUNSELING 
Theology and Psychology 
It is now time to look at existential psychiatry through the eyes 
of theologians. The theological nature of existential psychiatry with 
its carefully worked out anthropology was pointed out in chapter I. In 
chapter II the existential concept of man=s dilemma was noted, and in 
chapter III the soteriological means for easing this dilemma was examined. 
The question now arises: What relevance could such a topic have when ex—
amined theologically, and what justification is there for such an examil. 
nation? Existential psychiatrists are aware6of the fact that many of the 
problems they handle are purely within the realm of the spiritual and 
the theological. Edith Weigert shows how existential psychiatry stands 
at the bogrder between religion and psychiatry: 
There are many individuals who do not suffer from illnesses defined 
by a medical diagnosis; they are suffering from ill-defined unhap—
piness, loneliness, rootlessness, meaninglessness of living; they 
may not want to face their religious or spiritual conflicts: they 
may avoid the church and turn to a psychotherapist for help. Others 
Micistill have same emotional attachment to a church and a prejudice 
1 against psychiatry may turn with the very same problems to a minister.  
Likewise, Frankl points out that a special aptitude is needed on the part 
of the existential psychiatrist to diagnose properly spiritual problems. 
He says, 
To be concerned about the meaning of life is not necessarily a sign 
of disease or of neurosis. It may be; but then again, spiritual 
agony may have very little connection with a disease of the psyche. 
The  proper  diagnosis  can be made on17 someone who can see the 
q3iritual side of man. atalics mini]4 
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Frequently existential psychiatry treats cases that could better be treated 
by the church, according to Frankl's own admission. He tells of a patient 
who had a phobic reaction which developed into a physical symptom. The 
patient's fear was based on latent guilt. She was "cured" through logo-
therapy. Frankl then adds this concluding paragraph: 
Before embarking on their discussion, the doctor expressly asked this 
patient whether she had asked help of a priest and had confessed. 
She said that she had not and would not think of doing so. Yet to 
our mind this particular matter was a purely moral one and we hazard 
the assumption that if the woman had been a believer and had gone to 
confession, her conscience would have been relieved far more than 
any medical ministry could relieve it.3  
Existential therapy is being offered as a surrogate for religion, at least 
for those who refuse to relate to any present religious tradition. For such 
people Frankl has developed existential therapy to "help the individual com-
prehend his responsibility to accomplish each of his tasks," to teach him 
to "grasp the task character of life," and to "see life as an assignment."4  
Not only psychiatrists, but also pastors are forced to walk in this 
"no man's land" between psychiatry and religion. A. J. Ungersma warns 
that 
The pastor, regardless of whether he has been trained in psychotherapy 
or counseling, cannot escape the responsibilities of working in the 
field of pastoral psychology. Even should he want to escape, his 
people will not let him. If he resists their interests and needs 
here, he finds himself isolated and insulated, preaching an ethic 
that does not get through to ethos.5 
The relationship between the work of pastor and psychiatrist is well estab-
lished, then, and each must come to study and evaluate the modes of thought 
of the other. 
The Faith of Existential Psychiatry and the Christian Faith: 
einN Some Negative Observations 
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The first question in examining existential psychiatry theologically 
must be: Is its view of man adequate and Biblical? Tweedie believes that 
there is a close affinity to a Christian view of man in logotherapeutic 
anthropology. He points out that both have a holistic view of man, and 
yet both see man in different phases such as "soul, body, and spirit."6  
Yet, there is a notable Biblical element missing: That man is created in 
the image of God. Allers insists that for man to completely understand 
himself psychologically "he will have to realize anew, and with the totality 
of his being, that he is made in the image and likeness of his Creator."7  
The Bible is not a revelation of systematic anthropology, but one emphasis 
comes through again and again: 
that man is unique with respect to the rest of creation, that he is 
a spiritual creature, that he is made after the image of God. This 
image is not clearly detailed in the Scriptures, but it includes, 
at least, a unique potentiality of man to commune and have fellow-
ship with God.8  
If man has an imago Dei, then this must be given him by a Creator who 
both stands outside of man and holds man responsible to Him. Existential 
psychiatry not only fails to define the imago Dei, but fails to acknowledge 
the nature of the God whose image man bears and to whom he is responsible. 
Frankl, himself, admits this: "Existential analysis also remains noncommittal 
on the question of 'to what' a person should feel responsible-whether to 
his God or his conscience or his society or whatever higher power."9  
Another emphasis in the Biblical tradition not seen in existential 
psychiatry is the natural inclination of man toward evil. Tweedie sug-
gests that the phrase "will to meaning" be supplemented by the phrase "will 
to sin," and continues to point out that 
It is a central aspect of biblical teaching, and one having abundant 
empirical evidence, that man has within him a negative motivation in 
• 
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reference to the dictates of his conscience. The Apostle Paul ex-
presses it as being unable to do what one should do, and persisting 
in doing what one should not.10  
Krill likewise points out that "to live such authentic existence is by 
no means a simple rational process. For there is also in man the temp-
tation toward sloth, comfort, security--to view himself as a completed, 
righteous being. "11 While the existentialists would say that man has 
within himself the power to effect his own healing and meet his deepest 
existential longings, Christian theology says that because(of the "will 
to sin" man is not able to rescue himself. This must always come from 
outside of him. 
We want to become what we are; we have an inner compulsion to be 
ourselves . . . . But we cannot become what we are, unaided. There 
is a deep irony about the concept of self-realization . . . • We 
have this compulsion to self-actualization, or self-realization, yet 
the more we concentrate on realizing ourselves the more impossible it 
becomes. For the way to self-realization is not doing what we 
please . . . . Therway to self-realization is not by having our own 
way; instead, it is the way of the cross.12  
Theologians would agree that the existentialists have not presented an 
adequate doctrine of man. Kierkegaard, using existential language, sums 
up the situation. Like the existentialists, he also has diagnosed man's 
malady as bondage, loss of freedom to be his true self. In attempting to 
be free, man secures a false freedom, one that causes him to try to seize 
his own life by his own intelligence, or his own strength. Such a struggle 
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to pull one's self up by the boot straps cannot free a person, but can 
only draw him further into bondage. Man cannot heal himself.13 And so, 
existentialism, while it may afford deeper perspectives into a man's per-
sonality, does not produce a Christian concept of man.14  
This leads us to a further question: Does existential psychiatry really 
provide adequate goals for man's existential dilemma, and are adequate means 
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for reaching these goals given? Tweedie claims that the goal of Christian 
psychotherapy is the transformation of personality. He quotes Paul: "Be 
not conformed to the world, but be transformed by the renewing of your 
mind."15 Tweedie is hinting at ethical responsibility as a proper goal. 
There can be no doubt that existential psychiatry refuses to speak of a 
specific ethic to which a person should be transformed. Frankl says that 
Existential analysis equally forbears to say what a person should feel 
responsible for--for the realization of which values, for the fulfil-
lment of which personal tasks, for which particular meaning to life. 
On the contrary, the task of existential analysis consists precisely 
in bringing the individual to he point where he can of his own accord 
discern his own proper tasks.4.' 
In commenting on this aspect of existential analysis, Tweedie points out 
by way of contrast that Christian theology has specific goals and a specific 
ethic: 
Also for the Christian there is the necessity for grounding. one's life 
in an objective realm of meaning and values. However, the Christian 
world and life view is very specific in terms of its value system. It 
affirms that God has revealed the true standard of values in the ten 
commandments of the moral law, and that these are binding upon all 
men everywhere.17  
This world was created by a transcendent deity who assigns specific tasks 
for each man and according to the specific talents of each man. When such 
tasks are fulfilled, the individual will reach the optimum of self-actual-
ization.18 In existential analysis the ethical (law) demandis removed 
from man's awareness and he is guilty no longer to someone outside of 
himself, but to himself alone. Likewise, the goals of assisting the patient 
to be able to work, to enjoy life, to be able to suffer, are not spiritual 
enough for the spiritual man. Faith should be the real goal. "One wonders 
why suffering is so important over against faith, in logotherapeutic teachings, 
inasmuch as suffering eannot'be construed as an end in itself."19 
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Many have commented that existential psychiatry, in addition to not 
providing adequate goals for the spiritual man, has also not provided a 
proper means to reach its own goals. How does one overcome dread, despair, 
or anxiety? Maslow criticizes the existentialists for not having a de-
finitive answer to this question. He calls such talk a "high I. Q. whim-
pering on a cosmic scale, for which the only remedy seems to be a stiff 
upper lip!1120  Tweedie claims that there is an answer to these existential 
dilemmas which existential psychiatry has not expressed. The Christian be-
lieves that "the meaning of suffering . . . has been clearly set forth in 
the vicarious suffering of Jesus Christ. This is the theme that is the need 
of the heart of the suffering patient."21 With sharp insight he states that 
In the area of unavoidable suffering, the Bible offers the comfort 
and solace of eternity with God as the objective ground for which 
Logotherapy, at best, can offer only a vague existential hope. Man 
can endure every hardship, and every tribulation that his destiny 
dictates when he can, by faith, affirm With the Apostle Paul that 
the "suffering of this present time cannot be compared with the glory 
that will be revealed." It is a most significant contribution of 
Logotherapy to emphasize the value potentiality of necessary suf-
fering, but it is only the biblical world view which gives it its 
rationa1.22  
Likewise with guilt, "Frankl . . . gives little space to the consideration 
of the resultant despairing sense of guilt that is such a significant human 
experience."23 In the Christian world view, true guilt is the-consequence 
of disobeying God, the result of sinful choice. It is considered the divine 
warning to man of his failure to be responsible and should never be analyzed 
or psychologized away.24 Logotherapy has said that only a being who has 
responsibility can became guilty. But the remedy for objective guilt, 
which comes from a failure before objective responsibility, is lacking.25  
The theologian, of course, has his answer for the existential dilemmas, 
including guilt. Perry LeFevre summarizes Kierkegaard's theological re- 
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sponse: 
Christ, does disclose us to ourselves So that we see what we really 
are, im such a way that we are ready to accept healing because we 
realize that we can do nothing ourselves; second, because he also 
shows us what God is--that God is for us, that he forgives us. When 
we accept God's forgiveness, we act in faith. We acknowledge God as 
God. In this moment of acknowledgement we are restored to integrity; 
we rec9ive a new self. In that moment and for that moment we are 
free.2°  
Ultimately, then, the theologian sees the greatest weakness in existential 
psychiatry's resources to be the lack of an understanding of God's unique 
deliverance in Christ. The existentialists have demonstrated a need for 
"salvation" and have attempted to provide one in logotherapy. But this is 
a humanized, or secular, salvation. This is the major theological criticism 
that Thomas C. Oden makes of the existential system of Carl Rogers: 
If Christian theology centers in the kerygmatic announcement that God 
has once for all acted to reclaim his broken creation, Rogers' secular 
theology remains a dekerygmatized, secular affirmation of the human 
possibility for redemption, omitting any overt proclamation of any 
divine deed. In therapy there is no cosmic salvation event which 
forms the basis of one's knowledge of the ground of acceptance, as 
in Christian worship. The therapeutic process limits itself strictly 
to the assumption that some accepting reality is being mediated through 
a special interpersonal relationship, without braving the question of 
the source of acceptance as a fundamental question of being. Con-
sequently Rogers develops a soteriology without a Christology, i.e., 
a view of the saving process without a historical event which once 
for all manifests and defines that saving process and gives the history 
of salvation a center in time and space.a 
Oden does not suggest that psychotherapy is made ineffective because it 
lacks a language about God, Rather, he suggests that in this lacuna of • 
a limited humanism Christian humanism can pick up the thread "affirming 
all that has been said about therapy, but completing it with the pro-
clamation of the self-disclosure of God as the ontological basis of the 
whole process."28 Rogers and all existentialists, then, have overestimated 
man's ability to reach ultimate self-fulfillment apart from God's delivering 
activity. 
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Existential Psychiatry and Pastoral Counseling: 
Some Positive Observations 
Same of the negative reactions of theologians to existential psy-
chiatry has been shown. But there have been many positive comments and 
evaluations of the usefulness of this mode of psychotherapy within the 
context of pastoral counseling. Following is an examination of some of 
these considerations. 
Existential psychiatry does not try to cover up the great problems 
of life by smothering the surface symptomatology. It takes life and its 
problems seriously. Rollo May feels that one of the major contributions 
of existential analysis, both in psychotherapy and in religious counseling, 
"is in helping people frankly to admit and confront their Angst, hostility, 
and guilt, to face the facts of destructiveness and evil psychologically 
as well as culturally in our world."29 Likewise, Abraham Maslow has com-
mented on the preoccupation of the existentialist writers with what he 
calls the "seriousness and Profundity of living" which is to be contrasted 
to the "shallow and superficial life, which is . . . a defense against the 
ultimate problems of life. "30 
Such a serious estimate of life develops from the awareness of the 
validity of the transcendent and the spiritual nature of man. Needle 
notes that 
An old, and in modern times little considered, point of view is 
becoming more prominent in the contemporary scene. It is that the 
essence of man is not to be discovered as a material or psychological 
mechanism, but only through a transcendent point of reference. Man 
is a spiritual, existential entity whose problems will only be pro-
perly understood and dealt with when his true religious characteristics 
are brought to the focus of attention.31 
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And again 
Logotherapy is not a Christian anthropology in any technical sense, 
but it has the same basic emphases in its presentation. Here is an 
anthropological direction for which the Christian therapist may 
be truly thankful inasmuch as it presents a picture of man as an 
essentially spiritual, existence, and from the setting of modern 
clinical psychiatry." 
Ungersma shows that religion must not only rejoice at this development 
within psychotherapy, but must also pick up its own responsibility: 
In existentialism, philosophy is ready to speak of man in terms of 
transcendence, a subject upon which religion should be expert, for 
in this frontierland its spiritual researchers have done considerable 
exploration. And when existential analysis in logotherapy is ready 
to speak of "leaving the door open" to transcendental values, sug-
gesting a validity to what lies beyond as well as the limitations 
of therapy, religion must be ready to pass through the door to test 
validity, for this is its particular providence. The day may yet 
come when psychology will be enabled to take down its defenses 
against the spiritual dimension of man that it erected in the days 
of its adolescent rebellion.33  
Robert C. Leslie commends existential analysis to pastoral counselors for 
a similar reason: 
Tested in the rigors of concentration camp living, logotherapy 
offers a philosophy of life and a method of counseling which is 
more consistent with a basically Christian view of life than any 
other existing system in the current therapeutic world.34  
How then will the pastoral counselor use the methods of existential 
psychiatry, and what supplementation must he make? First, there exists 
a common base, and that is the need of the person who comes for help. 
This need is for genuine love and concern to be present on the part of 
the pastor or psychiatrist. Psychiatrist Edith Weigert believes that 
"at the bottom of the most desperately lonely perversion there still glows 
the hidden yearning for redeeming love, and pastor as well as psychotherapist 
is able to rekindle this concealed glowing by the sensitivity of his under- 
standing."35 The practical common base is human love and understanding. 
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The love that the pastor or psychiatrist will express toward a patient 
or a parishoner often demands that the person find fulfillment of his needs 
in the act of confession. Frequently a person is unable to accept love 
and understanding until the prior attitude of confession and self-disclosure 
has been reached.36 Weigert again makes the point that a counselee ap-
proaches his pastor with a need for confession. He does not always ex-
press such a need verbally, but he does feel the existential hurt resulting 
from his own awareness that he does not make use of his abilities but con-
siders himself a failure. He expresses himself in terms that are more 
psychological than theological. But a superficial application of either 
psychology or theology will not help much. 
The psychiatrist as well as the pastoral counselor in our time has 
arrived at the conviction that a change in inner attitude of the 
patient . . . can take place only when he is able to confess . . • 
what is hidden from his awareness,37  
A minister as well as a psychiatrist can be helpful to prepare the way for 
this kind of a change of attitude. Be must remove the obstacles of con-
flict, abolish the network of lies, illusions, and self-deceptions by the 
painful process of confession.38 To be effective, two things are required. 
One, that pastor and counselee have to invest much time and energy in con-
fession. An empty ritual will not reach the depth of individual suffering.39  
Secondly, there must be "a frank admission that . . . the source of the 
commandments" that have been broken and cause guilt is "God the Father." 
"It is not merely a sense of guilt, nurtured and whipped.up as it were by 
a cruel superego, which as such remains almost totally unconscious and be- 
yond the control of reason and will." Guilt is real, and to overcame it 
takes real love and real acceptance and real forgiveness! 
When talking about real forgiveness we are talking about the relation- 
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ship between God and man. As Zilboorg points out, "Psychology as a scien-
tific discipline can shed no light whatsoever on the relations between man 
and God.1141 This is the realm of theology. Theologians believe that 
ultimately the goal is for the person to feel, not the love of the psychia-
trist or pastor alone, but the love of God which stands behind him, empowers 
him, and works through him. "The love of God that forgives, heals, and saves 
us from despair is the meaning we seek most of all. Only by such love does 
life have meaning great enough to fulfill the deepest need of every lif .142 
Weigert points to the "healing and reconciling power of love" as being 
therapeutic,43 but the theologian insists that the source and reality and 
power of that love must be known. 
This is the essence of the psychodynamics of the Christian faith and 
must be spelled out further. The pastor does not relate his own love alone. 
His concern and acceptance are mirrors of what he believes to be a more 
cosmic truth. 
In the Judaeo-Christian tradition the original understanding of 
salvation was that God unconditionally accepts the sinner, and this 
in spite of his sin. But this is only the negative half of the 
truth. The positive half is that God accepts, not merely, "to 
save the sinner from hell," but because he knows the ultimate po-
tential and meaning of which the sinner's life is capable. In the 
matter of establishing relationship, the pastoral counselor of course 
carries the matter into the transcendent realm, for he believes that 
God also is involved in the relationship and that God seeks to es-
tablish or accomplish his purpose:in and through human relationship." 
The relationship is not an end in itself, but is a means to another end, 
the transcendental relationship. But the process is cyclical. The person 
who stands in a whole relationship with the transcendental likewise is 
freed to stand in a healA  relationship with other men. This becomes a 
communal relationship." Thomas C. Oden spells out the precise working of 
this communal relationship: "God is known in Christ as the source of all 
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comfort, who meets us in all our afflictions with his divine comfort, thus 
enabling us to comfort others with the comfort with which we ourselves have 
been comforted by God."46  
Does this mean that the source of comfort (God) must always be 
spelled out? Oden suggests that 
As "the kingdom of God does not consist in talk but in power" 
(I cor. 4:20), likewise psychotherapy does not consist merely in 
talk, but in the power mediated through this unique personal re-
lationship, which finally consists in making transparent the power 
of the accepting reality present in life itself.47  
However, Oden demonstrates that in Christian theology healing (therapeia) 
must be ballanced with proclamation (Kerygma). He demonstrates at length 
the number of New Testament passages which link these two terms together 
as one work: 
The Servant-Messiah was remembered as one who uniquely blended the dual 
ministries of kerygma and therapeia in genuine involvement with the 
world. He "went throughout all Galilee, preaching in their synagogues 
and casting out demons." (Mark 1:39) Great multitudes of people came 
"to hear him and to be healed of their diseases" (Luke 6:17) • • . • 
According to Luke's Gospel, "They departed and went thrp ghout the 
villages, preaching the gospel and healing everywhere.' 
Therefore, kerygma complements therapeia by witnessing to the latent and 
hidden source of healing, God Himself. Healing without proclamation would 
be like the election of a president without it reaching the newspapers. 
This proclamation is not an announcement of the idea of healing, but an 
announcement of the One who has healed and continues to heal, Jesus Christ." 
Oden provides a concise summary: 
To affirm that Jesus is the Christ is to affirm that the reality which 
we meet in the now is the reconciling, forgiving, renewing reality 
which is proclaimed and celebrated in the therapeutic ministry of 
Jesus of Nazareth. Thus if psychotherapy exists in quest for to 
Christ, the kerygma announces the end of all our Christ quests. °  
Kerygmatic healing comes to the world from God through the instrumen- 
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tality of the church or Christian community and its instruments, the means 
of grace. Through the church God is relating to the world. Therefore, the 
church must be acting toward men as God acts. Browning posits several theses 
to explain this relationship theologically: 
1. It is God's primordial nature to be related to the world in the 
sense of feeling its feelings. 
2. This primordial relationship would partake of the nature of rapport. 
3. The concept of unconditioned empathic acceptance also has im-
plications for an understanding of God as creator. 
4. Whether empathic acceptance is seen from the perspective of 
creation or soteriology, it follows as an implication of this analogy 
when applied eminently to God that empathic acceptance should be the 
most pervasive datum impinging upon each individual's experiencing, 
and for this reason the form of empathic acceptance should constitute 
the image of God in man. 
5. Applying the therapeutic relation to God means that not even the 
fall of man can qualify God's capacity to be empathicallly accepting.51  
The pastor reflects this nature of God in his pastoral work, but more; 
he also demonstrates the'objective validity of God's acceptance by using 
the means by which the Spirit convicts man of God's truthful -love and 
acceptance. William Hulme shows that the Scripture performs this function: 
The incarnation of the Word in Christ is both a finished work and an 
ongoing process. Its purpose is to unite the human with the divine 
in the individual personality. This union is a dynamic rather than a 
static condition and requires the continuous reception of the testi-
mony of the Spirit to maintain and expand its realization. As a means 
through which the Holy Spirit works to release the creative powers 
of personality, the Bible can serve as the needed inspirational support 
for the counseling process . . . .52  
The Spirit likewise uses the sacrament of Holy Communion. Zilboorg points 
out that the sacrament of communion is an incorporation of the nature and 
likeness of Christ into the will or self-concept of the person. The process 
of such a change in self-concept (from guilt to forgiveness) requires an 
understanding of the saving relationship of the person to Christ. At the 
same time, the reception of the image of Christ into the self-concept of 
the person is an admission or confession that the person sees himself in a 
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new and redeemed light.53  
Hulme points out that communion also demonstrates the dimension of 
Christianity called fellowship.54 The whole person must see himself as an 
accepted member of a larger body. In this case, it is the Christian church. 
Paul Barkman draws heavily upon the Book of James to demonstrate that healing 
(therapeia) is closely connected with a group or community of concerned, 
believing individuals. 
Is any sick among you? Let him call the elders of the church; and 
let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the 
Lord; And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall 
raise him up; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven 
him. Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, 
that ye may be healed. The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous 
man availeth much.55  
Barkman believes that no man can see himself as others see him. Therefore, 
he is dependant upon the community to reflect, share, and communicate with 
him. 
The perceptive reader already sees these concepts imbedded in James' 
treatment of healing. The sick person is to call the brethren. He 
could pray, and he should (5:13); but when he is sick he is supposed 
to call for others to pray with him too (5:14-16). There is in—
dividual responsibility here, but only up to a point. 
Please notice also that the elders whom James mentions are to be good 
therapists in the sense that they accept the sick friend and his sins. 
There is no hint here of advice or admonition from the elders. They 
are to pray for the afflicted one. One does not pray for someone in 
this way unless he is known to have a problem. The elders evidently 
recognize that there is something worth praying about, but since the 
sick one has asked for help, there is no further need to judge what 
he has already judged by asking for help. He is already willing. 
He has not rebelled. The elders do the proper thing. They listen 
and pray. 
Here, then, the process of healing the existential dilemma of man belongs 
to the community of believers. James, as well as existential psychiatry, 
believes that deep inner concerns must be brought out before another person. 
This is the way God has chosen, through the church and its means, to reach 
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man with His healing. "The church must return to its true healing ministry, 
and every Christian must become more skillful in his ability to listen, 
love and support."57  
If it is true that "much of the anxiety and illness of our time is due 
to the loss of community, to the inevitable conflicts engendered by multi—
ple membership in groups with conflicting patterns,"58 then it is also 
true that the restoration of community in the church would be one of the most 
effective preventative measures that the church might take for the pre—
servation of mental health and the growth of persons into a more meaningful 
life.59  
The theological conclusions of this paper might be summarized by saying 
that clergymen recognize that God's healing of existential dilemmas occurs 
on many different levels in many different situations, but ultimately, man's 
dilemma cannot be fully solved without a realization of the unique healing 
process introduced by God Himself into human history in the Person of Jesus 
Christ. Theologians are thankful for the insights of existential psychiatry 
and for the many common concerns for the healing of man that exist between 
the two disciplines of psychiatry and theology, but they likewise point out 
that pastoral counseling finds its unique "fulfillment there where the. Strange 
Word is heard, where the Third Party enters the conversation, where people 
know themselves to be standing in God's presence."6° Only in this way can 
one fully treat the "spiritual phase" of man's personality. 
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